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Feels Like Déjà Vu:
An Australian Bill of Rights and Religious Freedom
Paul Babie & Neville Rochow
I. INTRODUCTION: HAVEN’T WE BEEN HERE BEFORE?
While the world undergoes a religious revival,1 the protection of
religious freedom, particularly of minority religious groups, seems
increasingly under threat.2 Most religious scholars report that
religious liberty is “treading water at best, retreating at worst.”3
According to the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, nearly 70
percent of the world’s 6.8 billion people live in countries with high
restrictions on religion.4 Religious constraints take two forms:
“official curbs on faith and . . . hostility that believers endure at the
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1. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 6–7, 125 (2009).
2. The mainstream media continues to demonstrate this threat. See, e.g., Joshua
Kurlantzick, The Downfall of Human Rights, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2010, at 30. Religious
leaders have also drawn attention to this threat. See, e.g., Denis Hart, The Right to Religious
Freedom, SWAG, Summer 2009, at 26. And it has received recent scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth H. Prodromou, International Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Proselytism, in
THINKING THROUGH FAITH: NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN SCHOLARS
247 (Aristotle Papanikolaou & Elizabeth H. Prodromou eds., 2008).
3. Religious Freedom: Too Many Chains, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2009, at 111–12.
4. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 1
(2009), available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Government/
restrictions-fullreport.pdf.
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hands of fellow citizens.”5 All of this is troubling, especially in light
of the fact that The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”),6 one of the great international breakthroughs in the
protection of human rights, came only in the last century. From any
perspective, human rights such as religious freedom appear to be
under threat,7 making current both its international status and
domestic protection through constitutional or other legislative
means.
Although there have been recent breakthroughs with the
international protection of religious freedoms, not every democratic
state provides the comprehensive protection for human rights—
including religious freedom—found at the international level.
Australia’s record, for instance, demonstrates the discordance that
can exist between domestic and international protection. While
successive federal governments have made it a matter of policy to be
critical of what are considered to be human rights abuses and denial
of due process in other countries, even ratifying several international
covenants relating to human rights and freedoms, Australia has
implemented few of them as part of its domestic law. It may in fact
come as a surprise for many people to learn that Australia is the only
Western democracy still lacking, at a minimum, a legislated bill or
charter of human rights and freedoms.8 No comprehensive
protection of rights and freedoms exists—either at the federal
constitutional or at the state legislative level—and any protections
that are afforded are on the narrowest of bases.
Still, from the moment of its Federation in 1901, the “bill of
rights question”—whether to adopt one and, if so, what rights it
should protect and how they should be enforced—looms large in
Australia’s constitutional history, oscillating between periods of wild
enthusiasm, on the one hand, to apathy coupled with a lack of
sophisticated discussion, on the other. A new era in this history
dawned when, in late 2008 (on the sixtieth anniversary of the

5. Religious Freedom: Too Many Chains, supra note 3, at 111.
6. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
7. Kurlantzick, supra note 2, at 30.
8. The terms “bill” or “charter” of human rights and freedoms tend to be used
interchangeably in the Australian debate. This Article uses “bill of rights” or “bill” in reference
to either a bill or a charter of human rights and freedoms.
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UDHR), the Attorney-General of Australia launched the National
Human Rights Consultation (“the Consultation”).9 The
Consultation empowered a National Human Rights Consultation
Committee (“the Committee”) to seek the views of the Australian
community on how human rights and responsibilities should be
protected in the future and to promote a broad discussion on the
range of available options. For many, this meant a renewed, but by
no means new, discussion about whether or not Australia should
adopt a national bill of rights.10
In late 2009 the Committee, having received more than 35,000
submissions and conducted over sixty-five community roundtables
and public hearings in more than fifty urban, regional, and remote
locations across the country, delivered its Consultation Report to the
Attorney-General.11 The Committee favored the protection of
human rights (including religious freedom) within what has come to
9. This was an outcome of an election promise made by the Labor Party in 2007.
ANDREW BYRNES, HILARY CHARLESWORTH & GABRIELLE MCKINNON, BILLS OF RIGHTS IN
AUSTRALIA: HISTORY, POLITICS AND LAW 146–47 (2009).
10. Robert McClelland, A Message from the Attorney-General the Hon Robert
McClelland MP, http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/
Who_AMessagefromtheAttorney-GeneraltheHonRobertMcClelland (last visited Aug. 27,
2010).
The Terms of Reference given to the Committee included asking the Australian community:
(i) which human rights (including corresponding responsibilities) should be protected
and promoted,
(ii) whether those human rights are currently sufficiently protected and promoted, and
(iii) how could Australia better protect and promote human rights?
In accepting these Terms, the Committee agreed to:
(i) consult broadly with the community, particularly those who live in rural and
regional areas,
(ii) undertake a range of awareness raising activities to enhance participation in the
consultation by a wide cross section of Australia’s diverse community,
(iii) seek out the diverse range of views held by the community about the protection and
promotion of human rights, and
(iv) identify key issues raised by the community in relation to the protection and
promotion of human rights.
NAT’L
HUMAN
RIGHTS
CONSULTATION
COMM.,
TERMS
OF
REFERENCE,
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/
Terms_of_Reference (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
11. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION COMM., NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS
CONSULTATION REPORT (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/
www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Report_NationalHumanRightsConsultationReportDownloads;
see also Australia Recieves National Human Rights Consultation Report, GOV MONITOR (Oct.
1, 2009), http://thegovmonitor.com/world_news/ asia/australia-releases-national-humanrights-consultation-report-7855.html.
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be known as a “weak dialogue” model bill of rights12 (one in which
the judiciary plays a role in determining the consistency between laws
and administrative acts and the rights enumerated in the bill of
rights, but in which the legislature retains the ultimate or final say in
the constitutionality of such legislation or acts). Since the release of
the Consultation Report, however, with a federal election looming
sometime in 2010, and an intractable split within the federal cabinet
on this issue, the political climate has changed, and doubt exists as to
whether Australia will adopt a national bill of rights any time soon.
Obviously, the fact that this is a renewed discussion means that
every previous Australian attempt to entrench human rights in
domestic law met with opposition and, ultimately, failure. Andrew
Byrnes, Hilary Charlesworth, and Gabrielle McKinnon identify two
recurrent themes in this opposition.13 The first, a powerful “States’
rights” stream of thought, argues that entrenching human rights at
the federal level will unacceptably encroach on State legislative
powers and consequently undermine the federal system. The second
advances a democratic claim—pointing to the apparent
incompatibility of such instruments with Australian parliamentary
democracy. In Australia’s early history, in the 1890s, the concern
involved the impropriety of admitting that such limitations might be
needed in a parliamentary democracy, while in more recent times this
has morphed into an argument that legislatures enjoy a superior
capacity, as compared to the judiciary, to protect human rights, and
that a bill of rights will disrupt, and perhaps even undermine, the
political process.14
Australia’s failure, yet again, to adopt a bill of rights therefore has
a familiar ring. In fact, this story evokes what we refer to in this
Article as a strong feeling of déjà vu, a sense that we have been here
before and that we have already heard all of the arguments in one
form or another. More to the point, the Consultation, the attendant
concern about a bill of rights, and the final outcome of failure add a
new chapter in this long national story of failure, eliciting an even
stronger sense of déjà vu. It is not the purpose of this Article to
canvass in detail the reasons advanced in opposition to a bill of rights
12. The Terms of Reference for its consultation required the Committee not to pursue
options inconsistent with a “weak dialogue” model. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION
COMM., supra note 10.
13. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 35–36.
14. Id.
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in those previous failed attempts. Nor is the purpose to examine all
of the reasons advanced in opposition to a bill during the
Consultation. Rather, we focus on the reasons advanced, one might
think paradoxically, by religious groups opposed to a bill of rights.
We focus on those arguments because they are representative of the
sorts of reasons typically advanced in the past by the range of groups
who opposed comprehensive human rights protection.
Finding those reasons in the contemporary debate is not difficult,
for in establishing the Consultation, the Australian Government
unleashed, perhaps unwittingly, a torrent of national concern
amongst religious communities regarding the protection of religious
freedom should a bill of rights be enacted. Many religious groups
made formal submissions to the Committee in relation to the
protection of religious freedom.15 And while some supported a bill,
those voices were drowned out in large part by those opposed. Two
themes emerged from this opposition (which parallel opposition to
previous attempts to entrench human rights): (i) a concern with the
protection of equality, and (ii) a concern that a bill or charter would
confer powers on the judiciary to override the will of the executive
and legislative branches of government.
This Article traces this story of déjà vu in four parts. The first is
found in Part II, which briefly outlines the historical background to
the current attempt to entrench human rights in Australian domestic
law. Because the federal Constitution provides no comprehensive
protection for human rights, there have been a number of attempts
since Federation in 1901, both constitutional and legislative, to fill
that gap. Focusing on Section 116 of the Constitution, which comes
closest to a protection of religious freedom, we outline those
attempts at comprehensive coverage, and their ultimate failure.
Part III describes the second chapter of this story: the current
domestic Australian protection of human rights other than the
minimal protection found in the Constitution. Again, as with
constitutional amendment, these efforts result in little more than
piecemeal protection. In other words, they merely add to, rather
than alleviate, the feeling of déjà vu evoked by the constitutional
story outlined in Part II.

15. See, e.g., AUSTL. CHRISTIAN LOBBY, SUBMISSION TO THE NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS
CONSULTATION, (2009) available at http://australianchristianlobby.org.au/wp-content/
uploads/090615-ACL-NHRC-submission.pdf.
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Part IV examines the two principal recommendations contained
within the Consultation Report: that the government adopt a
dialogue model for a bill of rights, and that the bill itself protect a
range of human rights, among them religious freedom. This Part
explores the nature of a dialogue model and, specifically, the weak
dialogue model recommended by the Committee. It then considers
the right to religious freedom. As the Consultation Report itself says
little about that right, this Part focuses more on the reaction of
religious groups during the consultation process. The concerns
expressed by some of these groups relate to the enforcement of
rights and the possibility that dialogue, of any kind, between the
legislative and judicial branches of government would weaken
parliamentary sovereignty. These concerns form part of the
contemporary feeling of déjà vu, for they have been seen before in
previous failed attempts and in the minimal domestic protection
currently afforded human rights. At their core, while religiously
motivated, the concerns expressed really constitute a general
discomfort with the conferral of power on the judiciary, a discomfort
seen throughout the historical debate about a bill of rights in
Australia.
Part V adds the most recent chapter to this story of déjà vu,
bringing us back to where we began: failure. The first two months of
2010 brought the news that the federal government was backing
away from the proposal for a bill of rights contained in the
Consultation Report. This Part briefly outlines the waning
enthusiasm, both amongst the public and within the government, for
a bill of rights. In light of the history mapped in the first three parts
of the Article, this seeming failure of the most recent attempt to
protect human rights ought to come as no surprise. Quite the
contrary, this latest chapter is entirely consistent with that long
history; indeed, it is in the contemporary failure that one feels déjà
vu most acutely.
II. HISTORIC ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS: THE FIRST
TIME AROUND
This Part mirrors the two categories of historic attempts to
entrench human rights in Australian law. The first section examines
those attempts involving the Commonwealth Constitution, focusing
specifically on a representative example of the minimal protection
found there: Section 116, which provides only apparent protection
826
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for religious freedom. The second section considers Commonwealth
legislative efforts to entrench human rights.
A. The Australian Constitution
1. Minimal protection of rights and freedoms
The earliest attempts to entrench human rights occurred during
the Federation Conference held in Melbourne in 1890 and in the
Constitution Conventions held in various cities in 1891 and 1897–
1898. Yet even during the Melbourne stage of the 1898
Convention, which produced the most extensive discussion in this
regard, rights were more ridiculed than supported, especially as they
might have applied to the States.16 Somewhat less concern, though,
was expressed in relation to limiting the federal Australian
(Commonwealth) Parliament.17 Indeed, some even viewed the lack
of specific protection for human rights as an attribute, clearly
demonstrating the democratic character of the Constitution.18
Robert Moffatt explains that at the time of the drafting of the
Australian Constitution, there was not, as had been the case in the
United States, a “recent memory of a bitter struggle against
tyrannical devices to make [the drafters] determine to erect
permanent protections against their use again . . . . [T]hey must have
felt that the protections to individual rights provided by the
traditions of acting as honourable men were quite sufficient for a
civilised society.”19
Thus, while the Constitution empowered the federal Australian
Parliament to make laws “with respect to . . . external affairs,”20
enabling it to implement by way of legislation international treaties
and covenants, including those that contain human rights norms,21
the Framers ultimately did not include a bill of rights in Australia’s

16. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 24–25.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 25–26.
19. Robert C. L. Moffatt, Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional
Tradition, 5 SYDNEY L. REV. 59, 85–86 (1965).
20. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxix).
21. See Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen
(1982) 153 CLR 168.

827

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/26/2010 6:32:35 PM

2010

Constitution,22 providing only the barest protection of rights, as
follows:
(i) Section 51(xxxi)—the Commonwealth acquisition of
property must be on just terms;23
(ii) Section 80—providing a right to trial by jury on a
Commonwealth indictment for an offense against
Commonwealth law;24
(iii) Section 116—the Commonwealth is not to make any law
for the establishment of any religion or prohibiting free
exercise of any religion;25 and
(iv) Section 117—a resident of a state may not be subject to any
state law that provides for a disability or discrimination.26
These four rights operate mainly to limit legislative and executive
action by the federal government and are amenable to review by
courts established under Chapter III of the Constitution (including
the High Court of Australia). This is significant, for in addition to
these limited express rights, the courts have found a number of
implied rights affording (i) freedom of political communication,27 (ii)
freedom of political communication as a limitation on the law of
defamation,28 (iii) the right to due process ensuring equality before
the law,29 and (iv) privilege of communications between a lawyer and
client.30 The courts, in other words, have filled gaps the framers saw

22. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 24–25.
23. Ex parte Lawler (1994) 179 CLR 270; Burton v. Honan (1952) 86 CLR 169; Bank
of New S. Wales v. Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1; Minister of State for the Army v.
Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261.
24. Cheatle v. R (1993) 177 CLR 541; R v. Brown (1986) 160 CLR 171; see also
Cheng v. R (2000) 203 CLR 287.
25. Church of the New Faith v. Comm’r for Payroll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120; Ex rel.
Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559; Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v.
Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116; Krygger v. Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366; see also
Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Grace Bible Church v. Reedman (1984) 36
S.A.S.R. 376; Harkianakis v. Skalkos (1999) 47 N.S.W.L.R. 302.
26. Leeth v. Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455; Street v. Queensland Bar Ass’n
(1989) 168 CLR 461.
27. Nationwide News Pty Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Austl. Capital Television v.
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
28. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520; Theophanous v. Herald &
Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v. W. Austl. Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182
CLR 211.
29. Leeth v. Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455.
30. See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 121 (Austl.); see also Daniels Corp. Int’l Pty Ltd. v.
Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n (2002) 213 CLR 543, [11]
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fit to leave open. But this, of course, provides only a minimal
expansion of rights and nothing like the comprehensive protection
found in the constitutional bills of rights of other democratic states.
2. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution
Focusing on one of the express rights offers valuable insight into
the approach taken by the Framers in excluding a bill of rights from
the Constitution. Section 116, which expressly deals with religious
freedom,31 found its way into the Constitution as a result of petitions
circulated by Christian organizations during the Constitutional
Conventions of the 1890s. The petitions “asked for the recognition
of God as the supreme ruler of the universe; for the declaration of
national prayers and national days of thanksgiving and
‘humiliation.’”32 The essence of the petitions was to demand that the
Constitution include reference to the Christian identity of the new
nation. Difficult though drafting such reference was, the Framers
settled on including these words in the Preamble: “Whereas the
people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland,
and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty
God . . . .” 33
The mention of “Almighty God” reopened a debate about
prohibiting religious tests and religious establishment, on the one
hand, and a concern to limit restrictions on the free exercise of
religion, on the other.34 Ultimately, this settled itself in the
disclaimer of Section 116, which struck a balance between the two
sets of interests and the opposing fears they represented.35

(“Legal professional privilege is not merely a rule of substantive law. It is an
important common law right or, perhaps, more accurately, an important common
law immunity. It is now well settled that statutory provisions are not to be construed
as abrogating important common law rights, privileges and immunities in the
absence of clear words or a necessary implication to that effect.”).
31. On the history of this provision, see J.A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 228–29 (1972); HELEN IRVING, TO CONSTITUTE A NATION: A
CULTURAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA’S CONSTITUTION 165–68 (1999); JOHN QUICK &
ROBERT RANDOLPH GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN
COMMONWEALTH 951–53 (1901).
32. IRVING, supra note 31, at 166.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 167.
35. Id. at 167–68; see also RICHARD ELY, UNTO GOD AND CAESAR: RELIGIOUS ISSUES
IN THE EMERGING COMMONWEALTH, 1891–1906 (1976).
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Yet while this may appear at first blush to be a largely happy
reconciliation of the competing interests, the text of Section 116
itself limits its potential. Because it operates as a constraint only upon
the federal legislature,36 Section 116 prohibits the Commonwealth,
but not the States, from legislating to establish a religion or to limit
the free exercise of religion.37 And while the Australian provision
goes further than the First Amendment, prohibiting not only federal
laws “establishing any religion,” but also the use of law to impose
religious observance or to administer a religious test as a qualification
for public office, the potential contained in the text, unlike its
counterpart American provision, remains largely unrealized.38
Responsibility for the limited use of Section 116 lies squarely
with the Australian courts. While the American judiciary invokes the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution to protect the
right to freedom of religion, Australian judges historically treat its
counterpart, notwithstanding its remarkably similar wording, as part
of a nineteenth century British statute, rendering it a virtual dead
letter as a means of conferring any substantive rights, and rendering
it of little practical import as a tool for protection of religious
freedom in Australia. Paradoxically, this narrow interpretation flows
from the judicial assertion that Section 116 is dislocated from a bill
of rights, properly understood. In the celebrated DOGS Case,39 for
example, the High Court noted that:
[Section 116] does not form part of a Bill of Rights. The plaintiff’s
claim that it represents a personal guarantee of religious freedom
loses much of its emotive and persuasive force . . . [when it is
recognised that] s. 116 is a denial of legislative power to the
Commonwealth, and no more.40

Despite its being the most direct adoption of an American
constitutional provision, the narrow construal of Section 116

36. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; see also Grace Bible Church v.
Reedman (1984) 36 SASR 376.
37. See LA NAUZE, supra note 31, at 228–29; IRVING, supra note 31, at 165–68.
38. Attorney-General (Victoria); Ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth (DOGS Case) (1981)
146 CLR 559, 579 (Barwick, C.J.); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 1 (1947); FREDERICK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 44–61
(1995).
39. DOGS Case, 146 CLR at 579.
40. Id. at 652 (Wilson, J.).
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confines its operation when compared to its American counterpart,41
despite an apparent expectation on the part of some Framers that
American jurisprudence might influence its interpretation.42 This has
led the High Court to reject claims that legislation infringes upon
the freedom of religion when it has been argued that:
(i) compulsory peacetime military training offends the religious
convictions of persons who believe that military service is
opposed to the will of God;43
(ii) the use of legislation for compulsory removal of Aboriginal
children from their families prohibited them from access to
and free exercise of their tribal religion;44 and
(iii) government funding of religiously-based schools amounted
to an establishment of religion.45

41. See Clifford L. Pannam, Travelling Section 116 with a U.S. Road Map, 4 MELB. U.
L. REV. 41 (1963); GEDICKS, supra note 38, at chs 1, 5, 6.
42. In their discussion of the anticipations expressed in the Constitutional debates on
Section 116, QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 31, refer to the debates which considered its
inclusion:
The strongest argument, however, for the adoption of the earlier part of sec. 116,
was found in the special form of the preamble of the Constitution Act, which recites
that the people of the colonies, “humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God,
have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Commonwealth.” Referring to this recital,
it was stated by Mr Higgins that, although the preamble to the Constitution of the
United States contained no such words as these, it had been decided by the courts
in the year 1892 that the people of the United States were a Christian people; and
although the Constitution gave no power to Congress to make laws relating to
Sunday observance, that decision was shortly afterwards followed by a Federal
enactment declaring that the Chicago exhibition should be closed on Sundays. Id. at
952.
Quick and Garran go on to discuss how it is a matter of conjecture as to why Section 116 was
limited to the Commonwealth and did not extend its prohibition to the States. The debate
cited in this connection again makes reference to American First Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 953; see Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333 (1866); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). It
seems, though, that not all Framers took the view that Section 116 would protect all manner
of religious practice. Tasmania’s Premier, Sir Edward Braddon, for instance, argued during the
Convention Debates for an amendment that “shall prevent the performance of any such
religious rites as are of a cruel or demoralising character or contrary to the law of the
Commonwealth.” IRVING, supra note 31, at 168 (citing I–V OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE
DEBATES OF THE AUSTRALIASIAN FEDERAL CONVENTION, ADELAIDE, SYDNEY, MELBOURNE,
1897–1898, at 657 (1986)).
43. Krygger v. Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366.
44. Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1.
45. Attorney-General (Victoria); Ex rel Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559.
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In its origin, its text, and its judicial interpretation, then, Section
116 fails to provide a robust protection of religious freedom. Only a
change in jurisprudence might rescue it from irrelevance, and such a
change requires either a constitutional amendment or the revival of
the views seemingly held by some of the Founding Fathers that the
Australian courts might follow the American First Amendment
jurisprudence that influenced its inclusion. The latter seems unlikely
while attempts at the former, as the next section shows, have ended
in failure.46
3. Constitutional amendment
There have been two attempts to amend Australia’s Constitution
so as to provide greater protection for human rights (including
religious freedom).47 Both of these amendments failed due, in large
measure, to an onerous amending formula. Section 128 of the
Constitution provides that a government-proposed amendment
requires a national referendum with a double-majority of both
electors and states.48 Since 1901, forty-four such referenda have been
held; as of 2010, only eight have received the required consent.49
Needless to say, in the words of former Prime Minister Sir Robert
Menzies, “to get an affirmative vote from the Australian people on a
referendum proposal is one of the labours of Hercules.”50
While providing the necessary background to understand the
current protection of human rights in Australia, these failed attempts
are also relevant and similar to the current debate about a bill of
rights. This section briefly recounts the two failed amendments that
sought to achieve the protection of human rights. A third attempt, in
1959, never went as far as a referendum, failing when the
Parliamentary Joint Committee established to assess the need for a
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights concluded that the absence
of such protection “had not prevented the rule of law from

46. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 31.
47. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9.
48. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128; see also PETER HANKS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN AUSTRALIA 28–32 (2d ed. 1996).
49. AUSTL. GOV’T, PARLIAMENTARY HANDBOOK OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA 2008, pt. 5 (2008).
50. J.B. Paul, Political Review, 46 AUSTL. Q. 116, 117 (1974).
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characterising the Australian way of life.”51 It concluded that
democratic elections and responsible government were sufficient
protections for human rights.52
The first attempt put to a referendum occurred in 1942–1944 as
a response to the Commonwealth’s power to manage post-World
War II reconstruction. A Constitutional Convention proposed that
there be inserted into the Constitution federal legislative power over
the “four freedoms”: speech and expression, religious freedom,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.53 The legislation54
proposed by the Commonwealth government would have given it
full power to legislate in relation to these freedoms. Because the war
prevented the bill from progressing to a referendum, the Labor
government introduced similar legislation55 in 1944 so as to give the
Commonwealth power to legislate over fourteen specific areas,
including a provision preventing State and Commonwealth
governments from abridging the freedom of speech in order to
protect against the perceived threat of imposed socialism, and
another provision extended Section 116 to the States. The
referendum lost decisively, achieving only a slim majority in South
Australia and Western Australia.56
Proponents of human rights protection waited forty-one years
for a second attempt to pass an amendment—a wait rewarded only
with a second failure. In 1985 the Commonwealth Labor
Government established a Constitutional Commission charged with
reporting on the revision of the Australian Constitution. An Advisory
Committee on Individual and Democratic Rights assisting the
Commission made minor proposals in 1987, drawing largely on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). In
an attempt to capitalize on the bicentenary of European settlement
of Australia, and before the Commission had issued its final report,
51. Brian Galligan, Australia’s Rejection of a Bill of Rights, 28 J. OF COMMONWEALTH
& COMP. POL. 344, 351 (1990).
52. Id. at 350–52; see also BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 27.
53. The “four freedoms” were first enunciated in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
1941 State of the Union Address to the United States Congress. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE
THAN EVER 1–16 (2004).
54. Constitution Alteration (War Aims and Reconstruction) Bill 1942 (Cth) (Austl.).
55. Constitution Alteration (Post-War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) Act 1944
(Cth) (Austl.).
56. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 26–27.
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the Commonwealth government proceeded with a referendum in
1988, placing four groups of amendments before the people,
including provisions to extend to the States the right to trial by jury
and, as in 1944, Section 116.57 The proposals were resoundingly
defeated and, while the Commission ultimately recommended that a
much more robust bill be inserted into the Constitution, all political
momentum for such reform evaporated with the failed referendum.58
B. Commonwealth Legislative Efforts
While both proposed amendments to the Constitution failed, the
Commonwealth government also attempted, once in the 1970s and
again in the 1980s, to provide legislative protection for human
rights. The first attempt failed and the second attempt achieved only
modest success.
1. 1970s: Human Rights Bill
Following its 1972 election victory, the Labor Government
introduced a human rights bill in an attempt to fulfil its obligations
under the recently signed ICCPR.59 In the long term, the
Government intended to amend the Constitution to provide for
individual liberties, and suggested that its proposed legislation would
precede such an amendment by protecting fundamental rights and
freedoms defined in terms similar to those found in the ICCPR.60
The proposed legislation was to apply to both the Commonwealth
and State governments as well as to private actions,61 and it
contained protections for defined rights, including the right
contained in Article 18 protecting the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion.
The proposed bill also contained an enforcement mechanism
requiring that any Commonwealth laws would be inoperative if
found by a competent court to be inconsistent with the legislation
unless they contained an express provision that they were to operate
notwithstanding the legislation. State laws would be invalid by virtue

57. Constitutional Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl.).
58. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 32–33.
59. Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) (Austl.).
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Mar. 23, 1976, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316.
61. Id. ¶ 18.
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of the Commonwealth law paramountcy clause found in Section 109
of the Constitution. And courts would enjoy the power to grant a
range of remedies. Attacked as unnecessary in a parliamentary
democracy and likely to politicise the judiciary and undermine States’
rights, Parliament never enacted the bill.62
2. 1980s: Human Rights Commission
In 1981, the Liberal-National Coalition government, eschewing
a bill of rights, enacted the Human Rights Commission Act 1981
(Cth) (“the HRC Act”). This legislation created administrative
remedies for breaches of rights recognized in human rights treaties,
such as the ICCPR, and a Human Rights Commission authorized to
examine Commonwealth laws and report to the Commonwealth
Parliament any inconsistencies with standards set by international
human rights standards.
The Labor party denounced the HRC Act as a “toothless tiger”63
and, when it came to power in 1983, set about implementing a
judicially enforceable bill of rights as a replacement. As had been the
case with its human rights bill in the 1970s, this legislation involved
a two-stage process: the introduction of a legislated bill of rights
followed by constitutional amendment. Commentators described the
draft bill as a general translation of the ICCPR into Australian law,
declaring protected rights to have the status of Commonwealth law
prevailing over federal legislation and, in the case of conflict with
State law, over that by virtue of Section 109 of the Constitution.
The Human Rights Commission would have the power to
investigate complaints and resolve those through conciliation,
settlement, or reporting to Parliament. The only judicial power
contained in the legislation was the Federal Court’s power to hear
complaints from those not subject to proceedings under impugned
legislation and to declare such laws repealed or inoperative if it found
them to be inconsistent with protected rights. The States mounted a
strong attack against the proposal, arguing it would have an adverse
effect on their legislative powers. An early federal election in 1984
put an end to this proposal, but not the attempt to implement a bill
of rights.64
62. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 28–29.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Id. at 31–32.
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In 1985, the Australian Senate Standing Committee on
Constitutional and Legal Affairs launched an inquiry into the
desirability of an Australian bill of rights. While the Standing
Committee would ultimately endorse a bill of rights, before it could
report the Australian Parliament introduced a revised draft bill of
rights into Parliament. The bill, which was passed by the House of
Representatives, failed to win support in the Senate. Opposed both
by those who thought it ineffectual and by those against bills of
rights generally, it was ultimately withdrawn in 1986. Having
therefore failed to implement a bill of rights, the Parliament set its
sights instead on the Human Rights Commission Act 1981—which
was due to expire five years from the date of its enactment—and
passed the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
1986 (Cth).65
In the result, neither the attempts at constitutional amendment
nor the Commonwealth legislative efforts to effect comprehensive
human rights protection ended with complete success. Rather,
failure overwhelmingly summarizes these attempts. The next Part
turns to the second chapter in this story of déjà vu—the resulting
piecemeal protection afforded by these minimal federal efforts and
the marginal additions made by the States and Territories.
III. CURRENT PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA:
ONE MORE TIME
Australia currently protects human rights through a patchwork of
international law, commonwealth and state laws, and institutional
arrangements. Because other scholars have comprehensively
examined these laws,66 this Part provides an overview of the
provisions offering protection for religious freedom. This exercise
provides further support for and background to the current feeling
of déjà vu. Specifically, some religious groups argue that a bill of
rights is unnecessary because protection of human rights already
exists.
65. Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 36–41, 73–138; AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, TOWARDS AN ACT
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: REPORT OF THE ACT BILL OF RIGHTS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
(2003),
available
at
http://www.jcs.act.gov.au/prd/rights/documents/report/
BORreport.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). For some of the history, see RYSZARD
PIOTROWICZ & STUART KAYE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND AUSTRALIAN LAW
(2000).
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A. International and Commonwealth Protection

At the international level, Australia accepts the procedures which
allow U.N. human rights bodies to provide redress to individuals
who claim violations of their rights under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination 1965 (“CERD”), the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, and the Convention Against Torture 1984 (“CAT”).67 At
the Commonwealth level, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
and the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) are the primary
legislative protections for human rights, although these take the
narrow foci suggested by their titles.
Institutionally, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986 (Cth), discussed in Part II, established the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission—since renamed
the Australian Human Rights Commission68—and conferred upon it
a number of functions concerning human rights. These functions
include research and education, examining existing and proposed
legislation for consistency with such rights, reporting to Parliament
on the need for laws or other actions to implement international
obligations, and examining Acts or practices of Commonwealth
authorities for consistency with protected rights.69 Still, reports and
recommendations of the Commission have no binding force in law;
in fact, Commonwealth governments frequently ignore them.70
B. State and Territory
The States and Territories provide somewhat wider legislative
protection against discrimination than that found in Commonwealth
legislation. More importantly, the advent of human rights legislation
in the Australian Capital Territory (“ACT”) and Victoria—the
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (“the ACT HRA”) and the Charter
of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (“the

67. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 37.
68. The Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act
2009 (Cth) sch 3, s 1 (No. 70, 2009) (Austl.), amended the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (Austl.) by renaming it the Human Rights
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (Austl.), and renaming the Commission the Australian Human
Rights Commission.
69. Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 11(e) (Austl.).
70. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 39–40.
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Victorian Charter”)—expands the power of administrative bodies in
those jurisdictions to monitor human rights violations.71
1. Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)
The ACT HRA, Australia’s first bill of rights of any kind,
protects a range of human rights and freedoms. In relation to
religious freedom, for example, section 14 enshrines the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, while section 27
protects the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture, religion,
and language. In addition to these specific religious rights, the ACT
HRA also covers the right to equality before the law,72 the right to
life,73 the right to privacy,74 freedom of peaceful assembly and
association,75 freedom of expression, the right to take part in public
life,76 and the right to liberty and security of the person.77
While the legislation preserves parliamentary sovereignty by
leaving ultimate decisions concerning the violation of human rights
to the ACT Legislative Assembly, there nonetheless exists a range of
enforcement mechanisms:78 (i) an obligation on decision-makers to
interpret ACT laws (excluding the common law) to be consistent so
far as possible with human rights;79 (ii) jurisdiction vested in the
ACT Supreme Court to issue declarations of incompatibility in cases
where legislation cannot be interpreted so as to be consistent (not,
however, affecting the validity of the legislation);80 (iii) a duty on the
Attorney-General to present written statements on the compatibility
of each government bill presented to the Legislative Assembly;81 and

71. Id. at 40–43.
72. ACT HRA s 8.
73. Id. s 9.
74. Id. s 12.
75. Id. s 15.
76. Id. s 16.
77. Id. s 18.
78. See BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 74–79, for the history and legislative
background to the ACT HRA. The ACT Government itself commissioned a study into the
options for human rights legislation prior to the enactment of the ACT HRA: AUSTRALIAN
CAPITAL TERRITORY, supra note 66.
79. ACT HRA s 30; see BYRNES ET AL, supra note 9, at 83–85 for a detailed discussion
of the operation of this provision.
80. ACT HRA ss 32, 33, 39.
81. Id. s 37.
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(iv) the office of Human Rights Commissioner, which has the power
to review laws for compatibility with the ACT HRA.82
The ACT HRA does, however, contain two significant
limitations. First, section 6 provides that “[o]nly individuals have
human rights.”83 Second, and more significantly, none of the
enumerated rights are absolute—section 28(1) imposes a general
qualification on each of the rights found in the Act:84 “[h]uman
rights may be subject to reasonable limits set by Territory laws that
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” As
such, any limitations placed upon enumerated rights must be
proportionate to the objective sought to be achieved by the
legislation; a list of factors contained in section 28(2) assists in
determining proportionality:85
In deciding whether a limit is reasonable, all relevant factors
must be considered, including the following:
(i) the nature of the right affected;
(ii) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(iii) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(iv) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose;
(v) any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the
purpose the limitation seeks to achieve.86
Critics predicted an increase in litigation following the enactment
of the ACT HRA; however, this prediction proved to be unfounded.
Indeed, some supporters might have hoped for a more vigorous
invocation of the Act by the courts rather than the cautious, often
superficial consideration given to enumerated rights usually to
bolster decisions reached on other grounds. While several decisions
considered the interpretive provision of section 30,87 and other
important issues relating to the application of the ACT HRA,88 as of

82. Id. s 41; see also id. ss 38, 43, 44, sch 2.
83. Id. s 6.
84. This is similar in its terms to the limitation found in section one of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982, Ch. 11 (U.K.), 1982, Ch. 11.
85. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 82.
86. ACT HRA s 28(2).
87. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 99–104; see Commissioner for Housing in the ACT
v. Y (2007) ACTSC 84; SI bhnf CC v. KS bhnf IS (2005) ACTSC 125.
88. See R v. YL (2004) ACTSC 115; Hausmann v. Shute (2007) ACTCA 5; Stevens v.
McCallum (2006) ACTCA 13; R v. Griffin (2007) ACTCA 6; Capital Property Projects v.
Australian Capital Territory Planning & Land Authority (2008) ACTCA 9.
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2008, no judicial decision had issued a declaration of incompatibility,
and no case had invoked the religious freedom provisions.89
The most significant impact of the ACT HRA on the
development of human rights protection has not come in the courts,
but through its effect on policymaking and legislative processes. This
impact is largely seen in changes wrought to the culture of
government—improving the quality of lawmaking in the Territory
through the pre-enactment scrutiny of proposed legislation90 and,
significantly, affecting the national debate91 about bills of rights in
other states and territories, including the Victorian Charter (to which
we turn in the next section).
2. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)
Following broad community consultation, with the ACT HRA
serving as an impetus, in 2006 the Victorian Parliament enacted the
Victorian Charter, which shares many of its characteristics with its
ACT counterpart. The parliamentary scrutiny and compatibility
processes found in the Victorian Charter came into effect on January
1, 2007, while provisions relating to public authorities and the
courts—the interpretation of law, declarations of inconsistent
interpretation, and new obligations on public authorities92—
commenced on January 1, 2008.93
The Victorian Charter applies to Parliament, courts, tribunals,
and to public authorities in order to protect human persons.94 Most
of the same human rights found in the ACT HRA are also protected
by the Victorian Charter. These include: the right to recognition and
equality before the law;95 the right to life;96 freedom of thought,

89. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 99.
90. Id. at 86–98.
91. Id. at 106–07.
92. Victorian Charter, pt 3, div 3–4.
93. For the background to the enactment of the Victorian Charter, see BYRNES ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 109–14; ALISTAIR POUND & KYLIE EVANS, AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE
VICTORIAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (2008); CAROLYN EVANS
& SIMON EVANS, AUSTRALIAN BILLS OF RIGHTS: THE LAW OF THE VICTORIAN CHARTER
AND ACT HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2008); GREG TAYLOR, THE CONSTITUTION OF VICTORIA
51–52 (2006).
94. Victorian Charter ss 6–7.
95. Id. s 8.
96. Id. s 9. By virtue of section 48, the Victorian Charter does not affect any law
applicable to abortion or child destruction passed before or after the Charter.
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conscience, religion and belief;97 freedom of expression;98 freedom of
assembly and association;99 and cultural rights (affirming the rights of
members of all cultural, religious, racial or linguistic communities to
exercise various rights related to membership in those
communities).100
As with the ACT HRA, section 7 of the Victorian Charter
provides that its enumerated rights are subject to such reasonable
limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society based upon human dignity, equality and freedom.
Additionally, the same non-exhaustive set of factors used to
determine whether a limitation is reasonable found in the ACT HRA
is found in the Victorian Charter.
Enforcement provisions of the Victorian Charter are also similar
to those found in the ACT HRA: compatibility statements must be
prepared when legislation is introduced into Parliament;101 legislation
may be overridden for a period of five years;102 and all statutory
provisions must be interpreted by the courts and any other decisionmaker in a way compatible with human rights, so far as it is possible
to do that consistently with their purpose and, if that is not possible,
the court or decision-maker may make a declaration of inconsistent
interpretation.103 Remedies for breaches of obligations of public
authorities are limited to those causes of action and grounds for
review that exist outside the Charter.104
To date, as with the ACT HRA, the most significant impact of
the Victorian Charter has been in the executive and legislative
spheres.105 Use of the Charter in the courts has been limited
primarily to criminal matters.106
The impetus generated by the ACT HRA and the Victorian
Charter—enactments seen as having contributed to knowledge
about how bills of rights might operate in the broader political
97. Id. s 14.
98. Id. s 15.
99. Id. s 16.
100. Id. s 19.
101. Id. ss 28, 30.
102. Id. s 31. On these grounds, see BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 123–33.
103. Victorian Charter ss 32, 36–37.
104. Id. s 39.
105. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 123–33.
106. See, e.g., R v. Benbrika (Ruling No. 20) (2008) VSC 80; R v. Williams (2007) VSC
2; R v. White (2007) VSC 142.
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landscape and, thus, overcoming the resistance and suspicion to such
protections107—resulted in public consultations in Tasmania in 2006
and Western Australia in 2007; neither process successfully produced
a bill of rights in those jurisdictions.108 Indeed, if anything, it appears
that the achievements of the ACT and Victoria paved the way for
diversity rather than uniformity of approach, opting for state- or
territory-based protection rather than a comprehensive national
enactment.
IV. THE CURRENT NATIONAL DEBATE AND THE NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT: DÉJÀ VU
Notwithstanding the failure of the state and territory processes to
catalyse comprehensive national action, the National Human Rights
Consultation generated debate around a loosely coalescing consensus
for a “dialogue” model bill of rights. And, as Part V will show, while
that process seems to have stalled, if not failed, it nonetheless reveals
the current trend. This Part contains two sections. The first outlines
the dialogue model for a bill of rights and, specifically, the weak
dialogue model recommended by the Consultation Committee in its
Report. The strong contemporary feeling of déjà vu comes, however,
from the negative response of some religious groups to a proposed
bill of rights of any kind, even if it included a protection for religious
freedom (which, in fact, the Report recommended). That response
forms the focus of the second section.
A. Can We Talk?: Dialogue109
The Consultation Report contained an extensive comparative
discussion of “dialogue” models for bills of rights found in other
jurisdictions—New Zealand, United Kingdom, ACT and
Victoria110—and recommended a “weak” dialogue model federal
Human Rights Act (bill of rights).111 All legislation in some way
107. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 139–40.
108. Id. at 141–45.
109. Id. at 44–72. On the full range of models, see AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY,
supra note 66, at 43–60; see also HON. SIR ANTHONY MASON AC KBE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
COURTS
¶¶
11–15
(2009)
available
at
http://www.iclrs.org/docs/
THE
Human%20Rights%20and%20the%20Courts%20-%20Canberra.pdf.
110. CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 241–62.
111. Id. at 361–64, 371–79. This recommendation may be regrettable, as it is not clear
that either constitutional amendment or legislative enactment as a weak dialogue model is the
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affects the distribution of power between the three branches of
government. In that sense, “dialogue” or “institutional
interaction”112 is not new. First introduced as a metaphor by Peter
Hogg and Allison Bushell for interaction between the three branches
in response to criticisms that judicial review under constitutional bills
of rights was anti-democratic or anti-majoritarian,113 dialogue has
always occurred in all Australian jurisdictions between the legislature
and the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, the executive. Moreover, it
comprises a feature of many constitutional systems, even those in
Canada and the United States, where the judiciary has the power to
invalidate legislation, seemingly giving it the last word on human
rights issues.114
Because human rights protection, whether constitutional or
legislative, directs the executive and the judiciary to conduct their
business in certain ways, dialogue models for bills of rights
encourage “conversation” between the three branches,115 allowing
the judiciary to comment upon the adequacy of legislation or to be
critical of the actions of the executive. The legislature can respond in
turn by amending legislation or administrative practices or the bill
might even leave open the possibility of allowing for an explicit
rejection of the judicial decision, all of which is generally seen as a
desirable outcome of the implementation of a bill of rights.116
Dialogue has generally taken two forms. First, in its “strong”
form, as in the United States, it may redistribute powers to such an
extent that the judiciary is given the power to invalidate acts of the
legislature for the infringement of enumerated rights. How strong
the dialogue is depends on whether the legislature has any recourse
to respond once the courts have spoken.
Strong dialogue has received extensive academic scrutiny in
Canada, where section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
only way forward. See Neville G. Rochow, Paying for Human Rights Until the Bill Comes,
University of Adelaide Law Research Paper No. 2009-004, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356382 (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
112. Leighton McDonald, Rights,“Dialogue” and Democratic Objections to Judicial
Review 32 FED. L. REV. 1 (2004) (Austl.).
113. Peter Hogg & Allison Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 75 (1997).
114. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, supra note 66, at 61.
115. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 51.
116. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, supra note 66, at 61–62.
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Freedoms of 1982 constitutionally entrenches this model.117 The
focus of debate in Canada turns on whether in practice the Charter
involves genuine dialogue or simply allows the judiciary’s view of the
meaning of human rights to supersede those of the other
branches.118 Some in fact argue that rather than true dialogue, the
outcome of the process mandated under the Charter is in fact
judicial “monologue” or even “ventriloquism.”119
Dialogue may, however, take a “weak” form, allowing the
judiciary to play a role in the enforcement of human rights short of
invalidation of legislation.120 This form permits institutional
interaction amongst the three branches of government and the
community while conferring on the legislature the “final say” in
relation to human rights issues. Under such a scheme, the judiciary is
not given the power to invalidate legislation (although it could do so
in relation to executive acts, including subordinate legislation) but
instead may express its opinion that a law is incompatible with
enumerated rights. It is then up to the legislature to determine
whether or not to amend the legislation in question so as to bring it
into conformity with the protected rights.121
The United Kingdom Human Rights Act of 1998, the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990, the ACT HRA and the Victorian
Charter are all weak dialogue models.122 These enactments reflect the
current trend in national legal systems to move away from the
American strong dialogue model, which gives substantial power—or
at least the courts have arrogated that power to themselves123—to
have the final say in matters of human rights protection and towards
a model preserving to the legislature its democratic function to
decide how best to protect human rights.124 Indeed, both the ACT
HRA and the Victorian Charter tip this balance further in favor of
the legislature by ensuring against judicial invalidation and in favor of
117. See BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 52.
118. Peter Hogg, Allison Thornton & Wade Wright, Charter Dialogue Revisited—or
“Much Ado About Metaphors,” 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2007); Special Issue: Charter
Dialogue Ten Years Later, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 1–202 (2007).
119. Christopher Manfredi & James Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg
and Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 513, 520–21 (1999).
120. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, supra note 66, at 61.
121. Id. at 61–62.
122. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 52–54.
123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
124. BYRNES ET AL., supra note 9, at 51.
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judicial declarations of incompatibility, thus leaving it to the
legislature to respond and, if it does nothing, leaving its policy
position and legislation to stand.125
As part of its weak dialogue package, the Consultation Report
recommended that only federal “public authorities” should be
required to comply with enumerated human rights—this would
include ministers, public servants, and government departments. In
the case of legislation, however, the bill of rights would require that
other laws be interpreted consistently with enumerated rights,
provided that this was consistent with Parliament’s intent. Where
incompatible, no invalidation would be possible; rather, only the
High Court would have the power to issue a “declaration of
incompatibility.” Such declarations would notify the government of
the incompatibility while leaving Parliament the final word in the
“dialogue” between the two branches of government as to whether
to amend the law.126
Yet, even before the National Human Rights Consultation
released its Report proposing a weak dialogue model, some religious
groups had already made their view clear on a bill of rights of any
kind.
B. Religion
Opposition to an Australian bill of rights certainly did not begin
with the establishment of the National Human Rights Consultation.
As we have seen, throughout the history of the Australian federation,
opposition is the rule rather than the exception when it comes to
protecting human rights. The current opposition, far from being
anything new, feels a lot like “déjà vu all over again,”127 with some
religious groups, paradoxically, leading the way.
This section provides an overview of the religious arguments, pro
and con, concerning a bill of rights, and the reasons for that
position. It is not exhaustive; rather, while it canvasses the views of
some members of the monotheistic traditions, it makes no pretence
to cover the range of views for and against a bill. The point of the
125. Id. at 52–54.
126. CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 361–64, 372–79; see also Edward
Santow & George Williams, National Human Rights Consultation Report: A Brief Summary,
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/Resources/docs/cohr/Brennan_
Committee_Report_Summary.pdf.
127. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 30 (1998).
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exercise is to use the protection of religious freedom to represent the
underlying grounds for opposition to a bill of rights, and in doing
so, to examine the specific religious concerns founded upon those
grounds. This exercise demonstrates the thread of déjà vu running
through the contemporary debate.
1. Support
Two principal positions supporting a bill emerge from the
religious debate: neutral or conditional support on the one hand,
and strong support on the other.
a. Neutral or conditional. The clearest example of neutrality is
found in the agnostic position advanced by the Australian Catholic
Bishops Conference, which takes the position that once the
government issues concrete proposals in relation to a bill it will
engage in dialogue on the proposed model.128 The Anglican Church
of Australia, on the other hand, offers conditional support dependent
upon the inclusion in any proposed bill of very strong protection for
religious freedom consistent with Article 18 of the ICCPR.129
b. Strong. The strongest Christian support comes from the Peace
and Legislation Committee of the Religious Society of Friends
(Quakers) and the Uniting Church of Australia (a union of the
Methodist, Presbyterian, and Episcopal Churches). In 2008, for
instance, the Uniting Church resolved to support a national bill of
rights which would (i) implement Australia’s international law
commitments to human rights; (ii) hold public institutions and
officials accountable for upholding and promoting human rights; (iii)

128. Some comments on the discussion paper: Freedom of Religion and Belief in the 21st
Century at the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, available at http://
www.hreoc.gov.au/frb/submissions/Sub995.Australian_Catholic_Bishops_Conference.doc
(last visited Aug. 27, 2010). See also Hart, supra note 2.
129. Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concerns with the Charter of Rights 2 (unpublished
manuscript presented at the Cultural and Religious Freedom Under a Bill of Rights
Conference, August 13–15, 2009, Canberra, Austl. Cap. Terr.) (on file with Professor
Parkinson at the University of Sydney Law School) [hereinafter Parkinson, Christian
Concerns]; Patrick Parkinson, Christian Views on the Idea of the Charter (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation from ‘Christian Concerns with the Charter of Rights,’ presented at
the Cultural and Religious Freedom under a Bill of Rights Conference, August 13–15, 2009,
Canberra, Austl. Cap. Terr.) (on file with Professor Parkinson at the University of Sydney Law
School) [hereinafter Parkinson, Christian Views].
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take account of Indigenous Australians; and (iv) be supported and
policed by properly funded, independent mechanisms.130
Largely as a consequence of their loose governmental structures,
it is somewhat more difficult to locate community positions within
the Judaic and Islamic traditions. Still, one can identify strong
support for a bill of rights among senior members of these traditions.
Ameer Ali, former President of the Australian Federation of Islamic
Councils, for instance, supports the protection of human rights
through a bill, arguing that such protection would strengthen rather
than weaken Australia’s democratic structure. Far from damaging
religious freedom, Ali argues that a bill would establish the equality
of every religion, thus bolstering the democratic structure which
protects religious groups from harmful legislation—particularly in
relation to terrorism and immigration—while simultaneously
defending against vilification by others. In the final analysis, Ali
argues, a bill has the potential to produce a more harmonious, plural
society.131
Whatever support—conditional or strong—exists amongst
religious groups, it is far outweighed by the myriad voices of
opposition. And it is here, in the opposition to a bill, that one begins
to feel this has all happened before.
2. Opposition
Just as it provides the strongest religious support, the Christian
community also displays the strongest opposition—the loudest
voices are those of the Australian Christian Lobby, the Presbyterian
Church (not in union with the Uniting Church), the Association of
Christian Schools, the Sydney Anglican Diocese, the Baptist Union,
and the New South Wales Council of Churches.132 This part is
divided into the underlying grounds of opposition—which are
130. Uniting
Justice
Australia,
An
Australian
Human
Rights
Act,
http://www.unitingjustice.org.au/issues/upholding-human-rights/hr-act.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2010); see also Uniting Church in Australia, National Assembly, SUBMISSION TO THE
NATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
CONSULTATION
(2009),
available
at
www.hrlrc.org.au/files/nationalhumanrightsconsultation_ucanationalassembly_0609-2.pdf.
131. Freedom of Religion and a Bill of Rights, ABC SPIRIT OF THINGS (Aug. 23, 2009),
available
at
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/spiritofthings/stories/2009/2659582.htm
#transcript.
132. Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 2–3; Parkinson, Christian Views,
supra note 129.
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common to secular opposition to a bill of rights—and the specific
concerns of religious groups for that opposition.
a. Grounds. Christian groups opposed to a bill of rights both
perceive an antipathy among many Australians towards exemptions
under anti-discrimination legislation for faith-based organizations,133
and believe that vague and poorly drafted anti-vilification legislation
results in a chilling effect on freedom of religious expression.134
Against this backdrop, specific grounds of opposition emerge, as
summarised by Parkinson:
(i)

a bill is simply not needed as rights are already protected in
clear legislation;
(ii) a bill does not of itself protect against the abuse of state
power or protect the interests of the vulnerable;
(iii) a bill would transfer power to make final determinations
over issues of policy from elected parliaments to courts,
leading to political and bureaucratic uncertainty and the
weakening of judicial independence;
(iv) a bill can too easily be used to provide leverage for
unrepresentative activists to win contestable rights that
could never have been achieved through democratic
processes; and
(v) a bill would effectively legislate selfishness, already too much
a feature of modern society, propelling individual rights
above the rights held incommunity.135
Objections (iii)-(v) express a general concern that courts will use
a bill of rights for illegitimate, undemocratic, and anti-majoritarian
purposes. This, it is argued, places the judiciary in a paramount
position relative to the other branches of government, allowing that
branch to “create” new rights, not unlike the right to privacy in the
United States,136 the major consequence of which will be to weaken
community.

133. Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 3–7.
134. Id. at 3.
135. These are summarized by Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 2;
Parkinson, Christian Views, supra note 129.
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The background to this decision
included Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Subsequent cases citing and extending the right to privacy include Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
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The Christian objections frequently speak of “interpretations” of
a bill,137 which, in the context of the five objections summarised by
Parkinson and given what we know about concerns with the weak
dialogue model, can only mean interpretations issued by courts.138 In
this light, objections (i) and (ii) become another way of asserting the
primacy of the legislative and executive branches as against the
judicial. And as we have seen in Part I, in every attempt to amend
the Australian Constitution in order to entrench rights, and in every
case of legislative enactments seeking to protect human rights, these
same arguments have been made.
b. Specific concerns. Resting upon the grounds of opposition
advanced by Christian groups are two specific concerns with a bill of
rights: (1) that anti-discrimination legislation generally, and the
protection of equality under a bill of rights specifically, will result in
judicial encroachments upon religious freedom, and (2) that when
used in conjunction with a bill of rights, anti-vilification laws will be
used as weapons in the hands of some groups to prevent religious
groups from discussing their faith in the public forum.
(1) Equality and anti-discrimination. In relation to antidiscrimination, the Christian worry is that judicial interpretations of a
bill of rights will allow “anti-discrimination [to] . . . become the
human right that trumps all others.”139 In two related concerns,
Christian groups believe this to be the manifestation of
“fundamentalism” about equality and anti-discrimination. First, they
believe that all limitations on eligibility to apply for particular jobs
should be abolished or severely restricted and, second, that human
rights belong to individuals, rather than groups.140 For some
Christian groups, this concern has specific implications relating to
hiring practices in faith-based schools, codes of conduct, marital
status, and to sexual practices.141
U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
137. For these, see Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 3–7.
138. See Patrick Parkinson, Submission to the National Human Rights Consultation
(2009).
139. Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 7.
140. Id. at 8–10.
141. Patrick Parkinson, A National Framework for Religious Freedom 4–6 (unpublished
manuscript on file with Professor Parkinson in the University of Sydney Law School) (2009).
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From its earliest history, faith-based schools emphasising a
Christian foundation have been a central part of Australian life.
Recently, there are many such schools, typically those within the
evangelical tradition and which take a strong view of the Bible as
central to life, which seek to provide an explicitly Christian
environment for children and young people. Some of these schools
require adherence to the Christian faith from all staff, including
administrators and maintenance personnel.142 These schools desire to
maintain this Christian environment for students and their parents by
means of their hiring practices, which are referred to not as
discrimination, but as “positive selection.” For these schools,
“[s]election based in part on a characteristic which is relevant to the
employment is hardly discriminatory. [It] is a common sense
distinction . . . .”143 These groups argue that the right of positive
selection in relation to faith-based schools is supported by Article 18
of the ICCPR. In fact, positive selection “[was] perhaps the
strongest theme running through all the church submissions to the
National Human Rights Consultation . . . and [this] affected their
submission on the [bill of rights].”144
From the Christian perspective, codes of conduct, marital status,
sexual practice, and belief in the supernatural have consequences for
the way in which adherents lead their lives. In other words, for those
who take this view, a religion imposes a code of conduct, the most
significant dimension of which involves marriage and the family and
beliefs concerning sexual relations before or outside of marriage, and
about homosexual practice (as distinct from homosexual
orientation).145 While religious groups claim to recognize that their
beliefs are no longer mainstream in relation to these codes of
conduct, they nonetheless argue that equality and anti-discrimination
principles threaten their codes of conduct, especially if, as they argue,
such principles become the human right that trumps all other human
rights.146

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
6.
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(2) Speech and anti-vilification. In relation to speech and antivilification law, two interrelated concerns predominate:
communicating about the faith and rival claims to truth.147 For some
religious groups, contemporary moral relativism stands in contrast to
their claims to know and teach absolute truth about the nature of
humanity, its place within the universe, and relationship to the
supernatural. For groups taking that position, this can produce
disagreement with others—one may believe that others are mistaken
because their beliefs are inconsistent. From the perspective of those
religious groups, this may require that one “point[] out areas of
difference with other world religions and declar[e] them to be wrong
in relation to those matters.”148
Rival claims to truth can cause problems within the context of
anti-vilification or religious defamation laws. Communicating about
the faith, evangelization, or mission can often represent the core of
practicing one’s religion. Thus, freedom to practice and persuade
others of the truth or value of what one believes is the very core of
religious expression. Yet anti-vilification laws can, and have, been
used in Australia as weapons by groups who feel that their own faith
has been impugned by those who claim to be evangelizing.149 As
such, some Christian groups argue that the
liberty to make rival claims in the free market of ideas is what makes
for a free society. Religions do not need protection from competing
claims to the truth. The freedom of one person to say that another
is wrong is mirrored by the freedom of the other to say that the
first person is mistaken.150

However, not all religious groups agree. Ian Lacey, Councillor of
the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, argues that while a
specific limitation for freedom of religion might protect those of one
religious tradition, any freedom of speech provision might allow
hate-propaganda directed against those who practise a particular
faith. Thus, the Jewish community would want to be assured that a

147. Parkinson, supra note 141, at 4–6.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. & Ors v. Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. (2006) Vict.
Sup. Ct. 284.
150. Parkinson, supra note 141, at 5.
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bill contained sufficient protections to prevent against such
vilification.151
C. The Consultation Report
For religious groups opposed to a bill, the only way in which to
overcome concerns with equality and vilification—if, indeed, from
their perspective, they could be overcome at all—would have been
through a proper implementation of Article 18 of the ICCPR.152
Careful drafting of this protection (or, to put it negatively, limitation
of the equality provisions) would protect freedom of thought,
conscience or religion, and ensure that governments and
organizations impose no greater limitations on freedom of religion
than is necessary. It could also ensure that religious freedom is
protected throughout the country. Additionally, state or territory
laws might be deemed partially invalid when they are inconsistent
with religious freedom.153 Christian groups suggested that such a
protection could be achieved by taking account of freedoms to: (i)
appoint people of faith to organizations run by faith communities,
(ii) teach and uphold a restrained and disciplined sexual ethic within
faith communities, (iii) distinguish between right and wrong, and
(iv) evangelize.154
The Consultation Report recommended the inclusion of a nonderogable freedom from coercion or restraint in relation to religion
and belief. The Committee recommended that under this right no
person could be coerced or impaired in their freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of their choice. While free to adopt a
religion or belief, however, the Consultation Report also included a
list of enumerated derogable rights, including the freedom of
thought, conscience, and belief, the freedom to manifest one’s
religion or beliefs, and the freedom of expression. Thus, while
protecting the right to choose a religion, the Consultation
Committee’s recommendations would allow limitations to be placed
on the practice of that religion. In fact, the Consultation Report
151. Freedom of Religion and a Bill of Rights, ABC SPIRIT OF THINGS (Aug. 23, 2009),
available
at
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/spiritofthings/stories/2009/2659582.htm
#transcript.
152. See Parkinson, supra note 138; Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 7;
Parkinson, supra note 141.
153. Parkinson, supra note 141, at 2.
154. Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 27–29.
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lacks anything like the strong limitations of potential equality rights
sought by Christian groups. On the contrary, it is the freedom of
religion that may be subject to limitations.155 It is interesting to note,
though, that the religious groups that opposed a bill of rights, while
arguing that their concerns might have been alleviated by strong
limitations placed around equality, nonetheless frankly admitted that
this would not have eliminated their opposition.156
V. CONCLUSION: FAILURE, OR, DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN157
And so we come to the end—at least for now. The story of
Australia’s failure to protect human rights in a national,
comprehensive way continues to unfold just as it has since the
federation of Australia over 100 years ago. The Consultation
Committee delivered its Report on September 30, 2009. The
following day, the Attorney-General issued a press release
announcing that the government intended to withhold public release
of the Committee’s recommendations until the final months of 2009
when it would also issue its formal response.158 This was perhaps
telling, for what followed is nothing less than the latest chapter of
failure in this long story.
The Attorney-General issued a response in October 2009,159
notable for how little it said about the prospects for a bill of rights.
While lauding Australia’s human rights record and the government’s
commitment to human rights, the Attorney-General stopped short
of endorsing the enactment of a bill of rights.160 The response
contained a general commitment to respecting the human rights that
underpin Australian society and a safe and inclusive democracy. The
statement also suggested that more be done to ensure that
fundamental human rights are considered by the government. Yet, it
suggested that there are other ways in which to protect human rights

155.
156.
157.
158.

CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 343–48, 366–70, 372.
Parkinson, Christian Concerns, supra note 129, at 29 (emphasis added).
BERRA, supra note 127.
See Australia Receives National Human Rights Consultation Report, GOV.
MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://thegovmonitor.com/world_news/asia/australiareleases-national-human-rights-consultation-report-7855.html.
159. Hon Robert McClelland, The Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in
Australia (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/
Page/Publications_NationalHumanRightsConsultationReport.
160. Id. at 1–3.
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short of enacting a bill of rights, including fostering a culture where
the fundamental human rights of all people are respected and
protected, and ensuring that a range of mechanisms are made
available to promote and protect those rights.161 The response even
qualified this minimal commitment by reiterating the terms of
reference to the Consultation Committee that any change to
enhance the protection and promotion of human rights and
responsibilities must preserve the sovereignty of Parliament.162 In
conclusion, the Attorney-General indicated that the government
would outline its response to the Consultation Report in the early
months of 2010.163 No such response has yet been issued.
In fact, by early 2010, it was increasingly apparent that this latest
comprehensive Australian attempt to protect human rights was
unravelling. The mainstream media published negative editorials
indicating significant unease about a bill of rights. In February, one
commentator argued that a weak-dialogue bill of rights giving the
legislative branch the final say about human rights would allow
lobbyists and the interest groups they represent to affect the way
government does business, resulting in the legislative fashioning of
narrow, interest-group-specific rights.164 Another took the view that
as the push for a comprehensive national bill had collapsed, the ACT
HRA and the Victorian Charter were pushing those jurisdictions and
their legal structures towards isolation, leaving them at odds with
mainstream jurisprudence in the rest of the country. This
commentator even went so far as to suggest that, as a consequence,
judges from those jurisdictions would no longer be fit candidates for
higher federal judicial office (especially the High Court).165
Although Fr. Frank Brennan, Chair of the National Human
Rights Consultation, even entered the fray to urge churches to back

161. Id. at 3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Elise Parham, Rights Charter Would Empower Only Lobbyists, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 4,
2010, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/rights-charter-wouldempower-only-lobbyists/story-e6frg6zo-1225826508311.
165. Chris Merritt, State Charter Sets Lawyers on Path to Isolation, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 19,
2010, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/state-charter-setslawyers-on-path-to-isolation/story-e6frg97x-1225831948234.
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a bill of rights,166 the negative pressure exerted by the media seemed
to work. As members of Parliament returned to Canberra in late
February for the 2010 sitting, reports emerged of widespread
opposition to a bill of rights within federal cabinet.167 Opposition
took the now familiar mantra that a bill would place too much power
in the hands of unelected judges.168 The Attorney-General was said
to be considering two options which, while falling far short of a bill
of rights, would offer some human rights protection: (i) a Senate
committee that would be given a test of compatibility with human
rights against which it could measure proposed legislation, and (ii)
an education awareness campaign about human rights.169 As of
March 2010, the Prime Minister’s ongoing silence on the
government’s official response, however, only fueled the fire of
speculation that a bill of rights of any kind was a non-starter.170
But even if the government were to adopt the Consultation
Report and enact a bill of rights in precisely those terms, what would
that mean for Australia? As we have seen, the Committee
recommended a weak-dialogue model bill of rights, providing that
only the High Court could issue declarations of incompatibility. This
would result in far less than the comprehensive protection of human
rights enjoyed by those in other nations with either constitutional or
legislative bills of rights. Rather than dialogue, the recommended bill
would ignore the federal structure of Australia and provide for a wish
list of rights to which Parliament aspires but which it is by no means
bound to implement. This would be nothing less than a legislative
human rights monologue, or even an elaborate ventriloquist act (to
reverse the argument advanced by Hogg and Bushell in relation to
the judiciary under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
allowing the legislative branch to put words in the mouths of the
judiciary concerning the protection of human rights. This would do

166. Susanna Dunkerley, Churches Urged to Back Charter of Rights, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-newsnational/
churches-urged-to-back-charter-of-rights-20100208-nn5g.html.
167. James Allan, Kevin Rudd’s Good Job on Opposing Rights Bill, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 19,
2010, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/kevin-ruddsgood-job-on-opposing-rights-bill/story-e6frg97x-1225831948151.
168. Rudd Govt Mum on Rights Charter Report, WA TODAY, Feb. 18, 2010,
http://www.watoday.com.au/breaking-news-national/rudd-govt-mum-on-rights-charterreport-20100218-og0n.html.
169. Allan, supra note 167.
170. Rudd Govt Mum, supra note 168.
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no more than entrench the status quo ante, placing confidence in the
democratic process, which—while having obvious strength as a form
of government—cannot provide a robust system for the protection
of the individual against the prejudices and whims of the majority. In
other words, the recommended bill could result in a protection of
human rights depending not upon the merits of the claim, but upon
the popularity of the cause.
This is purely a hypothetical exercise, of course, for while the
debate continues unabated about how one might affect Australian
society,171 it now seems clear that there is little likelihood of the
enactment of a bill of rights of any kind. Does it feel like we have
been here before? Australia has a long history of attempting to
protect human rights. It has an equally long record of failure.
Remember 1901 and federation. Remember 1942–1944 and the
first failed attempt to place human rights in the constitution; and
1959, the second attempt, which fell short even of a referendum;
and 1985, the third failure (and second at a referendum). Remember
the 1970s and 1980s and the largely unsuccessful Commonwealth
efforts at legislative protection. Remember the early 2000s when the
ACT and Victoria achieved legislative bills of rights, but failed to
convince other States and Territories to follow suit.172 In every era,
these efforts have produced more heat than light. There remains,
more than one hundred years after federation, no comprehensive
national protection of human rights. The consistent theme in this
narrative is failure. We can add 2009–2010 as the latest chapter in
this long story of failure. There is nothing new here; rather, it feels
very much like déjà vu all over again.
So where to leave the story for now, until the next time? Perhaps
with some speculation about the root cause of the failure itself. The
attitude towards an Australian bill of rights has in the past been
marked by an intractable political apathy borne of unbridled
optimism. That optimism is a national affliction. Using the

171. See, e.g., Francine Johnson & Edward Santow, How Would an Australian Human
Rights Act Impact Business? 38 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 7 (2010).
172. Although Tasmania recently announced its intention to enact a Charter of Human
Rights and Respnsibilities along the line of the ACT HRA and the Victorian Charter. See
Euthanasia Reform and Human Rights Charter Set for Tas, LAWYERS WEEKLY, June 22, 2010,
http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/blogs/top_stories/archive/2010/06/22/euthanasiareform-and-a-human-rights-charter-set-for-tas.aspx.
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Australian vernacular, it may be summarised as “she’ll be right,
mate.” The logic of this optimism seems to run this way:
Nothing bad could happen in Australia.
If it did, it wouldn’t be too bad.
If it was too bad, it wouldn’t happen for very long.
If it did happen for very long, it would happen to somebody else.

This is merely the latest chapter in this long story. How the story
will end and what effect it will have no one can really say. But
whatever the outcome, the reaction will almost certainly be that we
should not worry because she’ll be right, mate.
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